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Injustice in Black and White 
ELIMINATING PROSECUTORS’ PEREMPTORY 
STRIKES IN INTERRACIAL DEATH PENALTY CASES 
Daniel Hatoum† 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1990, Clarence Lee Brandley, a black death row 
inmate, proved he was innocent.1 Nearly a decade earlier, 
Brandley was part of a group of janitors who discovered the body 
of Cheryl Dee Fergeson, a sixteen-year-old white volleyball 
player, after she had been raped and murdered.2 The main 
suspects became the janitors, all of whom were white, except 
Brandley.3 During the initial interview, police said to the janitors: 
“One of you . . . is going to hang for this,” and then, turning to 
Brandley, added, “[s]ince you’re the n[——]r, you’re elected.”4 
Further, police were instructed to conduct a quick and sloppy 
investigation, so students could return to school.5 Police arrested 
Brandley without any evidence directly linking him to the crime.6 
The town, Conroe, Texas, was predominantly white, “and 
the number of blacks who showed up on jury panels . . . were 
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 1 WILLIAM WEBB, WRONGFULLY ACCUSED: 15 PEOPLE SENTENCED TO PRISON 
FOR A CRIME THEY DIDN’T COMMIT 26 (2013). 
 2 Id. at 24. 
 3 Id. 
 4 MICHAEL L. RADELET, HUGO ADAM BEDAU & CONSTANCE E. PUTNAM, IN 
SPITE OF INNOCENCE: ERRONEOUS CONVICTIONS IN CAPITAL CASES 121 (1992). 
 5 See id. 
 6 See id. at 121–22 (indicating the other janitors were not arrested because 
they corroborated each other’s stories, and that Brandley was implicated in the crime 
only by “inconclusive circumstantial evidence”); WEBB, supra note 1, at 24 (“Brandley 
was arrested and charged with rape and murder because he was the only janitor who 
couldn’t provide an alibi, not because there was evidence.”). 
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routinely struck from trial.”7 As a result, local lawyers could 
recall only one black person, who was also a police officer, ever 
serving on a criminal jury in Conroe’s County, Montgomery.8 
Brandley faced an all-white jury.9 The defense attorney 
speculated that Brandley’s testimony may have “alienated the 
jury” by contradicting white witnesses.10 Brandley’s first trial, 
however, ended with a hung jury, with only one holdout.11 
During and after deliberations, this holdout was subject to a 
series of racial slurs, threats, and calls because he refused to 
convict Brandley.12 In jury selection for the second trial, the 
prosecution used its peremptory strikes to eliminate all 
potential non-white jury members,13 and on little more than the 
questionable and self-interested testimony of the other janitors, 
Brandley was sentenced to death.14 
Years later, after fellow janitors came forth to contradict 
the state’s witnesses,15 and after further evidentiary review 
revealed that the evidence that could have exonerated him had 
been destroyed, Brandley was released, having now proved his 
innocence in order to earn exoneration.16 “The presiding judge 
wrote a stinging condemnation of the procedures used in 
Brandley’s case, and stated that ‘[t]he court unequivocally 
concludes that the color of Clarence Brandley’s skin was a 
substantial factor which pervaded all aspects of the State’s 
capital prosecution of him.’”17 
Brandley’s case is only one example of a common 
problem: the color of a defendant’s skin has a substantial effect 
on whether the defendant will be sentenced to death.18  
 7 RADELET, BEDAU & PUTNAM, supra note 4, at 122. 
 8 Id. 
 9 Id. at 124. 
 10 Id. 
 11 Id. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Id. at 125. 
 14 Id. at 124–25. 
 15 Peter Applebome, 7 Years Later, Hope for Texas Death Row Inmate, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 22, 1987), https://www.nytimes.com/1987/03/22/us/7-years-later-hope-for-
texas-death-row-inmate.html [https://perma.cc/3R26-FXNM]. 
 16 Innocence and the Death Penalty: Assessing the Danger of Mistaken 
Executions, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/innocence-and-
death-penalty-assessing-danger-mistaken-executions [https://perma.cc/8H2D-LRNG]. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Richard C. Dieter, The Death Penalty in Black and White: Who Lives, Who 
Dies, Who Decides, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (1998), https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-
penalty-black-and-white-who-lives-who-dies-who-decides#Black%20Defendants%20and%
20the%20Race%20of%20the%20Victims [https://perma.cc/CN7M-SPQF]; see also U.S. 
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFF., GAO-GGD-90-57, DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING: RESEARCH 
INDICATES PATTERN OF RACIAL DISPARITIES 5 (1990), https://www.gao.gov/
assets/220/212180.pdf [https://perma.cc/8GNT-LMQ7] (finding a “remarkably consistent” 
pattern of racial disparities in capital sentencing throughout the country). 
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Specifically, a black defendant is much more likely to be 
sentenced to the death penalty if the defendant is black, and the 
victim is non-black.19 One reason this happens is because of the 
systematic prevention of black citizens from serving on juries.20 A 
forceful tool that is used to deny black citizens the opportunity to 
serve on juries is the peremptory strike.21 Technically, the Supreme 
Court held in Batson v. Kentucky that a racial use of peremptory 
strikes is unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause,22 
and established a three-part test to determine and prevent 
peremptory strikes that were utilized with the purpose of striking 
a potential juror because of his or her race.23 
As this essay will document, however, Batson has failed to 
act as a total deterrent to striking black jurors, and “it seems that 
the only people not disappointed in Batson are those who never 
expected it to work in the first place.”24 And while the Court has 
steadfastly stuck to Batson in the equal protection context,25 
“death is different”26 and should be treated differently in an effort 
to guarantee that a person’s skin color is not a deciding factor in 
their execution—especially in light of a defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment right to a fair trial.27 Considering the inability to 
prevent racially charged peremptory strikes, even under Batson, 
and the seriousness of the death penalty, prosecutors’ peremptory 
strikes should be eliminated in death penalty cases where the 
victim and the defendant are different races, in order to 
ameliorate the manifestation of racial discrimination. 
 
 19 Dieter, supra note 18, at 5. 
 20 See Tanya E. Coke, Lady Justice May Be Blind, but Is She a Soul Sister? 
Race-Neutrality and the Ideal of Representative Juries, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 327, 350–51 
(1994) (acknowledging that race affects the perspectives of the people in the jury and 
their view of the evidence in a way that puts minorities at a disadvantage if they are 
underrepresented on the jury pool). 
 21 Catherine M. Grosso & Barbara O’Brien, A Stubborn Legacy: The 
Overwhelming Importance of Race in Jury Selection in 173 Post-Batson North Carolina 
Capital Trials, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1531, 1533 (2012) (recognizing substantial disparity in 
the use of peremptory strikes on racial minorities). 
 22 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986), modified, Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 
400, 402 (1991). 
 23 See id. at 90–96. 
 24 Grosso & O’Brien, supra note 21, at 1533. 
 25 Stephen B. Bright & Katherine Chamblee, Litigating Race Discrimination: 
Under Batson v. Kentucky, 32 CRIM. JUST. 10, 10–11 (2017) (describing the continued 
relevance of Batson v. Kentucky). 
 26 See Raoul G. Cantero & Robert M. Kline, Death Is Different: The Need for 
Jury Unanimity in Death Penalty Cases, 22 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 4, 12–13 (2009) 
(discussing that the finality and severity of the death penalty compared to other 
punishments); Steven Z. Kaplan, Why Death Is Different: Minnesota’s Experiment with 
Capital Punishment, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1113, 1115–16 (2004) (reviewing JOHN 
D. BESSLER, LEGACY OF VIOLENCE: LYNCH MOBS AND EXECUTIONS IN MINNESOTA (2003)) 
(arguing that the death penalty is different in part because of its history tied to lynching). 
 27 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
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This essay proceeds in the following four parts. Part I 
briefly explains the system of peremptory strikes. Then, Part II 
outlines the problem of rampant racial discrimination in the 
application of the death penalty. Part III further argues that the 
denial of black jurors from serving is a prime cause, while also 
suggesting that the cause of this problem is peremptory strike 
use. Part IV argues that eliminating peremptory strikes falls 
neatly within our current legal framework of constitutional 
jurisprudence, and therefore courts can adopt this rule without 
the passage of a formal law by the legislature. For a host of 
reasons, including that defendants’ very lives are at stake, 
courts have often viewed death differently than other 
punishments. Further, because a special procedure also applies 
in interracial capital cases under Turner v. Murray in order to 
ensure a defendant’s right to a fair trial, courts are justified in 
eliminating prosecutors’ peremptory strikes in interracial death 
penalty cases, even while courts in other cases may still allow 
the use of peremptory strikes. 
I. PEREMPTORY STRIKES 
A. The General Usage of Peremptory Strikes 
A trial in the American jury system begins with a process 
called voir dire, or jury selection.28 The purpose of this process is to 
ensure that a jury is selected that will uphold the defendant’s right 
to a fair trial.29 A large pool of citizens is summoned to participate 
in this process.30 In capital trials in Texas, for example, two 
hundred people or more are called in initially.31 From this group, 
twelve will eventually be selected to serve on the jury.32 
In the state system, where the vast majority of capital 
cases are pursued,33 jury selection is predominantly conducted 
 
 28 See, e.g., TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 35.17 (West 2009) (describing jury 
selection in Texas); Voir Dire and Jury Selection, JUDICIAL EDUC. CTR., http://jec.unm.edu/
education/online-training/stalking-tutorial/voir-dire-and-jury-selection [https://perma.cc/
9HBT-7NY8] (describing voir dire, selecting the jury and the questioning of potential jurors). 
 29 See Sellers v. Burrowes, 642 S.E.2d 145, 148 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007). 
 30 See Stephen Gustitis, Jury Selection in Texas Capital Murder Cases, 
GUSTITIS LAW (Jan. 8, 2013), http://www.gustitislaw.com/death-penalty/jury-selection-
in-texas-capital-murder-cases [https://perma.cc/4RMY-B4BX]. 
 31 Id. 
 32 See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 62.201 (West 1985). 
 33 See Mark Berman, The Justice Dept. Is Seeking Its First Federal Death 
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by the attorneys that are arguing the case.34 The attorneys ask 
the potential jurors questions in order to tease out any biases 
the jurors might have.35 If a juror is unable to objectively weigh 
the evidence due to a bias, one of the sides would ask that the 
juror be struck for “cause.”36 Lawyers have an unlimited number 
of strikes for cause, provided the lawyer can show a particular 
bias of a potential juror.37 Further, attorneys and judges in 
capital trials can ask jurors about their willingness to impose 
the death penalty.38 A juror who, for moral or other reasons, is 
unable to sentence someone to the death penalty will be struck 
by the court.39 This process of striking for cause because of the 
inability of a juror to sentence someone to death is known as 
“death qualification,”40 and it can only benefit the prosecution. 
Again, this type of strike is unlimited.41 
After all of this is over, lawyers can then decide to use 
peremptory strikes.42 Peremptory strikes are discretionary 
strikes that attorneys use to prevent any potential juror from 
serving on the panel, within constitutional limits.43 In capital 
cases, an attorney may have twelve or more of these 
discretionary strikes, depending on the state in which the case 
is tried.44 Technically, under the Batson v. Kentucky doctrine, 
 
 34 See Kenneth M. Mogill & William R. Nixon, Jr., A Practical Primer on Jury 
Selection, 65 MICH. B.J. 52, 52 (1986) (“Direct questioning of individual venire persons by 
attorneys, and the use of open-ended questions, are essential tools for effective voir dire.”). 
 35 Id. at 53. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Elliott Wilcox, How to Increase Your Number of Peremptory Strikes During 
Jury Selection, TRIAL THEATER (2016), http://www.trialtheater.com/jury-selection/
double-your-jury-selection-challenges.htm [https://perma.cc/RZ3H-NZN6]; see also 
Christina Marinakis, Maximizing Cause Strikes: How Do I Get Jurors to Say They Can’t 
Be Fair?, LITIGATION INSIGHTS (Feb. 9, 2017), http://litigationinsights.com/jurors/
maximizing-cause-strikes-admit-jurors-cant-be-fair/ [https://perma.cc/3QWR-F33H] 
(discussing elicitation of bias from prospective jurors). 
 38 George D. Knapp, Note, Death Qualification and the Right to an Impartial 
Jury Under the State Constitution: Capital Jury Selection in Utah After State v. Young, 
1995 UTAH L. REV. 625, 625 (1995); see also Stanton D. Krauss, Death-Qualification After 
Wainwright v. Witt: The Issues in Gray v. Mississippi, 65 WASH. U. L. QUART. 507, 507 
(1987) (discussing that judges have the power to remove a juror if that juror is opposed to 
the death penalty). 
 39 See Knapp, supra note 38, at 625. 
 40 Id. 
 41 See id. (describing death qualification as a form of strike “for cause”). 
 42 Mogill & Nixon, supra note 34, at 54 (indicating that parties are given 
peremptory strikes for use during jury selection); see also David C. Baldus et al., The Use 
of Peremptory Challenges in Capital Murder Trials: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 3 
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 3, 40 (2001). 
 43 See Keith A. Ward, Comment, “The Only Thing in the Middle of the Road Is a 
Dead Skunk and a Yellow Stripe”: Peremptory Challenges—Take ’Em or Leave ’Em, 26 TEX. 
TECH L. REV. 1361, 1361–62 (1995). 
 44 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 15-12-165 (2011) (allowing up to fifteen peremptory 
strikes in a capital case in Georgia); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 799 (1985) (allowing up to 
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neither the prosecutor, nor the defense, can use those 
peremptory strikes in order to strike a potential juror because of 
that juror’s race.45 Batson established a three-part test for 
determining whether a prosecutor utilized peremptory strikes to 
exclude a juror on the basis of race.46 First, the defendant must 
present a prima facie case that the prosecutor is purposefully 
discriminating.47 In order to do so, the defendant can point to the 
people the prosecutor struck, and the surrounding 
circumstances of the case.48 
Once the defendant has raised a prima facie case, the 
burden then shifts to the prosecutor to provide a race-neutral 
reason for the strike.49 The threshold a prosecutor must meet is 
quite low.50 Prosecutors need not even provide “an explanation that 
is persuasive, or even plausible.”51 Thus, “[u]nless a discriminatory 
intent is inherent in the prosecutor’s explanation, the reason 
offered will be deemed race neutral.”52 Finally, in the third step, the 
judge will decide whether this proffered reason is mere pretext or 
tied to the potential juror’s race.53 Thus, peremptory strikes are a 
well-established part of our jury selection process. 
B. The Trouble with Peremptory Strikes 
Since its conception, Batson has been heavily criticized 
as ineffective, especially by the only Supreme Court Justice at 
the time who was also an experienced trial attorney,54 Justice 
Thurgood Marshall.55 Justice Marshall felt that the Batson 
framework would “not end the racial discrimination that 
peremptories inject into the jury-selection process.”56 Justice 
Marshall had two chief complaints with the Batson framework. 
“First, defendants cannot attack the discriminatory use of 
peremptory challenges at all unless the challenges are so 
 
twelve peremptory strikes in a capital case in Louisiana); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 35.15 
(1991) (allowing up to fifteen peremptory challenges in a capital case in Texas). 
 45 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 84–87 (1986). 
 46 Id. at 96–98. 
 47 Id. at 96–97. 
 48 Id. at 96–97. 
 49 Id. at 97. 
 50 Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767–68 (1995). 
 51 Id. at 767–68. 
 52 Id. at 768 (internal citations omitted). 
 53 See id. at 768–69. 
 54 Thurgood Marshall: 2009 Inductee, TRIAL LAWYER HALL OF FAME, 
http://www.triallawyerhalloffame.org/inductees/thurgood-marshall/ [https://perma.cc/
4PCC-NF7Z]. 
 55 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 105–08 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring). 
 56 Id. at 102–03. 
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flagrant as to establish a prima facie case.”57 Since the burden 
falls on the defendant to present the evidence of the prima facie 
case, “[p]rosecutors are left free to discriminate against blacks 
in jury selection provided that they hold that discrimination to 
an ‘acceptable’ level.”58 Justice Marshall felt that this 
“‘acceptable’ level” would be easy to attain if, after strikes for 
cause, there were only a few black jurors left, depriving the 
defense of the argument that many jurors were struck because 
of the color of their skin.59 
“Second, when a defendant can establish a prima facie 
case, trial courts face the difficult burden of assessing 
prosecutors’ motives.”60 Justice Marshall remarked that it would 
be easy for a prosecutor to present a race-neutral reason, but it 
would be hard for the courts to be able to differentiate when that 
reason was real, or mere pretext.61 Justice Marshall elaborated: 
“[I]t is even possible that an attorney may lie to himself in an effort to 
convince himself that his motives are legal.” A prosecutor’s own 
conscious or unconscious racism may lead him easily to the conclusion 
that a prospective black juror is “sullen,” or “distant,” a 
characterization that would not have come to his mind if a white juror 
had acted identically.62 
These problems allow peremptory strike use to become a 
conscious or subconscious tool to inject racial bias into 
proceedings—especially in those instances when racial bias would 
give the prosecution a strategic advantage. 
II. EMPIRICAL DATA REGARDING THE INTERSECTIONS OF 
RACE, THE DEATH PENALTY, AND PEREMPTORY STRIKES 
A. Black Citizens Are More Likely to Be Sentenced to the 
Death Penalty Than White Citizens 
Black citizens make up a disproportionate number of 
those sentenced to the death penalty.63 For example, “[i]n 
Oklahoma and Missouri, black Americans are overrepresented 
on death row by nearly a factor of four.”64 Even in Georgia, which 
 
 57 Id. at 105. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. at 106. 
 62 Id. (alteration in original) (internal citation omitted). 
 63 See Matt Ford, Racism and the Execution Chamber, ATLANTIC (June 23, 2014), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/06/race-and-the-death-penalty/373081 
[https://perma.cc/K9YQ-7CNC]. 
 64 Id. 
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has a much larger black population, black citizens are 
overrepresented on death row based on their proportion to the 
population, with 48% of defendants on death row being black, 
compared to 30% of the general population.65 “In 
Louisiana, . . . blacks are roughly one-third of the population but 
more than two-thirds of the state’s death-row inmates.”66 
Overall, “[t]he national death-row population is roughly 42[%] 
black, while the U.S. population overall is only 13.6[%] black.”67 
While the bare numbers seem to be enough to 
demonstrate that the color of one’s skin has an effect on the 
chances of being sentenced to the death penalty, the reality 
seems to be more complicated. The biggest factor actually seems 
to be a combination of the race of the defendant and the race of 
the victim,68 as shown by the fact that “more than three-quarters 
of victims of death-row defendants executed since 1976 were 
white.”69 This is the argument made by the famous Baldus study, 
conducted by David Baldus and his colleagues, as discussed in 
McCleskey v. Kemp.70 
In the Baldus study, researchers “examine[d] over 2,000 
murder cases that occurred in Georgia during the 1970’s.”71 
When Baldus “divided the cases according to the combination of 
the race of the defendant and the race of the victim” he found a 
larger disparity.72 Specifically, “the death penalty was assessed 
in 22% of the cases involving black defendants and white 
victims; 8% of the cases involving white defendants and white 
victims; 1% of the cases involving black defendants and black 
victims; and 3% of the cases involving white defendants and 
black victims.”73 One reason the Baldus study is so significant is 
that Baldus controlled for “230 variables that could have 
explained the disparity on nonracial grounds,” and even after 
considering nonracial variables, the study concluded that black 
defendants who were convicted of killing white victims were far 
 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 John H. Blume et al., Post-McCleskey Racial Discrimination Claims in 
Capital Cases, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1771, 1776 (1998). 
 69 Ford, supra note 63. 
 70 See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 286 (1987). Professor David Baldus 
was a faculty member of the University of Iowa who conducted numerous studies on race 
and the death penalty. One of his most famous studies was the center of the McCleskey 
case, which is different than the study discussed infra, Section II.B. Adam Liptak, David 
C. Baldus, 75, Dies; Studied Race and the Law, N.Y. TIMES (June 14, 2011), https://
www.nytimes.com/2011/06/15/us/15baldus.html [https://perma.cc/XW37-VL5B]. 
 71 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 286. 
 72 Id. (emphasis added). 
 73 Id. 
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more likely to receive the death penalty.74 Despite the clear and 
convincing empirical data presented in the Baldus study, the 
Supreme Court in McCleskey nevertheless found it insufficient 
to overturn the defendant’s death sentence.75 
While the Baldus study is certainly eye-opening, it has 
faced criticism. For purposes of this essay, there are two critiques 
worth addressing. One is that the study, originally conducted in 
1983, is no longer current and, as a result, may not be accurate 
today. A second is that the study only discusses cases in Georgia,76 
so the results may vary across other states. Baldus and other 
authors, however, have since published more recent studies from 
other states, and have proven that the trend holds across time 
and geography.77 Thus, the race of the defendant affects whether 
that defendant will be sentenced to death, especially when the 
defendant is a racial minority and the victim is white. 
B. The Lack of Minorities on Juries Accounts for the 
Increased Likelihood That Minorities Will Be Sentenced 
to the Death Penalty—Especially for the Death of White 
Victims 
One major factor that has contributed to the increased 
sentencing of black defendants, especially when the victim is 
white, is that black jurors have been denied from serving on 
juries.78 One of the methods that has been used to deny black 
citizens from becoming jurors is peremptory strikes.79 While 
there is no aggregate data from across the country, there are 
several consistent empirical examples. For example, in 2017, 
over a quarter of the citizens of Houston County, Alabama were 
 
 74 Id. at 287. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. at 286. 
 77 See, e.g., David C. Baldus & George Woodworth, Race Discrimination and 
the Legitimacy of Capital Punishment: Reflections on the Interaction of Fact and 
Perception, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1411, 1425, 1441–42, 1447, 1449 (2004) (discussing 
several studies that address the race of the victim); Scott Phillips, Racial Disparities in 
the Capital of Capital Punishment, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 807, 838 (2008) (indicating race of 
the defendant and race of the victim matter); Glenn L. Pierce & Michael L. Radelet, The 
Impact of Legally Inappropriate Factors on Death Sentencing for California Homicides, 
1990–1999, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 8, 40 (2005) (discussing disparities in death penalty 
sentencing in California based on the victim’s race). 
 78 See generally EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, ILLEGAL RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 
IN JURY SELECTION: A CONTINUING LEGACY 14 (2010) [hereinafter EJI], 
https://eji.org/sites/default/files/illegal-racial-discrimination-in-jury-selection.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/D3VC-E8Z4] (discussing the exclusion of black jurors throughout the 
course of history to the modern day). 
 79 See id. 
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black.80 Yet, “half of [the capital] juries were all-white and the 
remainder had only a single black member.”81 This is because 
“prosecutors in Houston County, Alabama, have used 
peremptory strikes to remove 80% of the African Americans 
qualified for jury service.”82 
Another specific example from a county that has a high 
population of black citizens is the Caddo Parish of Louisiana, 
where the adult population is made up of 44.2% black citizens.83 
Absent a pattern of exclusion, “one would expect juries with 
[two] or fewer black members to occur in only 10.1% of trials. In 
Caddo, 22% of trials have [two] or fewer black jurors.”84 Further, 
based on the population, there should have been “an average of 
5.3 black jurors per twelve person jury.”85 Instead, the study 
found that only “an average of 3.86 jurors per jury were black.”86 
The researchers were able to track strikes in order to produce 
the following data and table:87 
 
Thus, the researchers found that the race of the potential jury 
panelist correlated highly with whether a peremptory strike 
would be utilized against that panelist.88 The chance that the 
disparity is unrelated to the race of prospective jurors is less 
than one in ten thousand.89 This provides further evidence that 
black citizens are being excluded from juries. 
 
 80 See U.S. Census Bureau Quick Facts: United States; Houston County, 
Alabama, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (July 1, 2017), http://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/
PST045215/00,01069 [https://perma.cc/6VH8-EA45]. 
 81 EJI, supra note 78, at 14. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Ursula Noye, Blackstrikes: A Study of the Racially Disparate Use of 
Peremptory Challenges by the Caddo Parish District Attorney’s Office, REPRIEVE 
AUSTRALIA 7 (Aug. 2015), https://blackstrikes.com/resources/Blackstrikes_Caddo_
Parish_August_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/QS4C-AZUZ]. 
 84 Id. at 10 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. at 8. 
 88 Id. at 8–9. 
 89 Id. 
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Even more compelling evidence was presented by a study 
that observed peremptory strikes in 173 capital cases in North 
Carolina.90 The authors concluded that “[p]rosecutors exercised 
peremptory challenges at a significantly higher rate against 
black venire91 members than against all other venire 
members.”92 Further, “prosecutors struck 52.6% (636/1,208) of 
eligible black venire members, compared to only 25.7% 
(1,592/6,185) of all other eligible venire members.”93 One judge 
commenting on this study exclaimed that “[t]he probability of 
this disparity occurring in a race-neutral jury selection process 
is less than one in 10 trillion.”94 
There are also two studies that control for various race-
neutral factors that may have affected the decision to strike, 
allowing researchers to rule out alternative explanations.95 
Those studies observed Philadelphia and Dallas County, 
Texas.96The Philadelphia study, co-authored by David Baldus, 
analyzed “317 capital murder cases tried by jury in Philadelphia 
between 1981 and 1997.”97 Baldus controlled non-racial factors, 
including the age and gender of the potential jury members.98 In 
doing so, Baldus found that prosecutors favored striking black 
venire members, but they did so in interracial cases where the 
victim was non-black and the defendant was black.99 Baldus also 
concluded that “[f]or the prosecutorial decisions, the only factor 
with a stronger effect than venire member race was an expressed 
concern about imposing a death sentence.”100 
Recognizing the significance of Baldus’s study, 
journalists with the Dallas Morning News utilized Baldus’s 
method to observe peremptory strikes in Dallas County, Texas 
in 2002.101 These cases were non-capital, but it allowed the 
 
 90 See generally Grosso & O’Brien, supra note 21 (studying peremptory strikes 
in capital cases in North Carolina). 
 91 The “venire” is the full group of people who are called into court to select the 
jury from. Sherilyn Streicker, Jury Selection in the Criminal Process, NOLO, 
https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/jury-selection-criminal-cases.html [https://
perma.cc/R94A-CY9S]. 
 92 See Grosso & O’Brien, supra note 21, at 1548. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Adam Liptak, Exclusion of Blacks from Juries Raises Renewed Scrutiny, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/17/us/politics/exclusion-of-
blacks-from-juries-raises-renewed-scrutiny.html [https://perma.cc/FY2S-44VP]. 
 95 See Baldus et al., supra note 42, at 3; Grosso & O’Brien, supra note 21, at 1539. 
 96 See Baldus et al., supra note 42, at 3; Grosso & O’Brien, supra note 21, at 1539. 
Baldus also authored the Georgia study discussed by the Supreme Court in McCleskey. See 
supra notes 70–75 and accompanying text. 
 97 Baldus et al., supra note 42, at 10. 
 98 See id. at 167. 
 99 See id. at 56. 
 100 Id. at 69 (emphasis added). 
 101 Grosso & O’Brien, supra note 21, at 1539. 
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journalists to pull from a large amount of cases for a shorter 
period of time.102 The journalists, controlling for non-racial 
factors, “found that prosecutors ‘excluded eligible [black venire 
members] from juries at more than twice the rate they rejected 
eligible whites.’”103 “The journalists concluded that ‘being black 
was the most important personal trait affecting which jurors 
prosecutors rejected.’”104 
Additionally, the absence of black jurors has an effect on 
whether a black defendant will be sentenced to the death 
penalty.105 “A 2004 study by the Capital Jury Project found that 
in cases with a black defendant and a white victim, having one or 
more black male jurors drastically lowered the chances of a death 
sentence.”106 David Baldus arrived at a similar conclusion in the 
study of Philadelphia trials, noting “that predominantly black 
juries (ones with five or more blacks) were less likely to impose 
death sentences than were juries with four or fewer black jurors.”107 
Thus, empirical analysis concludes that striking potential black 
jurors gives prosecutors a strategic advantage when attempting to 
convict a black defendant who killed a white victim.108 
C. Inferences Drawn from Empirical Data 
It can be inferred from these statistical studies and analysis 
that Justice Marshall’s criticisms of the Batson framework were 
correct, and that this is especially true for interracial capital cases. 
First, as the studies above show, it is easy for a prosecutor to strike 
black jurors, even with the Batson framework, as long as he or she 
provides a race-neutral reason.109 For example: 
Here are some reasons prosecutors have offered for excluding blacks 
from juries: They were young or old, single or divorced, religious or not, 
failed to make eye contact, lived in a poor part of town, had served in 
the military, had a hyphenated last name, displayed bad posture, were 
sullen, disrespectful or talkative, had long hair, wore a beard.110 
 
 102 Id. at 1539–40 (noting that “381 non-capital felony trials . . . during the first ten 
months of 2002” were examined). 
 103 Id. at 1540. 
 104 Id.  
 105 See William J. Bowers, Benjamin D. Steiner & Marla Sandys, Death 
Sentencing in Black and White: An Empirical Analysis of the Role of Jurors’ Race and 
Jury Racial Composition, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 171, 191–92 (2001). 
 106 Gilad Edelman, Why Is It So Easy for Prosecutors to Strike Black Jurors?, 
NEW YORKER (June 5, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/why-is-it-so-
easy-for-prosecutors-to-strike-black-jurors [https://perma.cc/8KAG-HBNB]. 
 107 Baldus et al., supra note 42, at 124. 
 108 Edelman, supra note 106. 
 109 See supra Sections II.A–B. 
 110 Liptak, supra note 94. 
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Further, the substantial amount of empirical analysis 
refutes the argument that black jurors are not on capital trials 
because black jurors are statistically less likely to support the 
death penalty.111 This is for two reasons. First, the use of 
peremptory strikes happens after the death qualification 
process.112 The research tracked the use of peremptory strikes, 
and thus, the researchers were able to control for that factor.113 
Second, even the studies that tracked non-capital felony cases, 
which do not include death qualification, demonstrate that black 
jurors are not serving on juries114 because of peremptory strikes. 
This shows that black jurors are disappearing from juries for 
other reasons that are not death qualification. Instead, we may 
infer that capital trials are merely subject to the same race 
problem that is present in all felony trials,115 but in capital trials, 
the problem becomes much more serious during sentencing.116 
Opponents of this position could argue that since Batson 
fails to prevent either the prosecution or the defense from 
striking on the basis of race, defense attorneys can equalize race 
on the jury by utilizing peremptory strikes to strike jurors that 
are the opposite race of the defendant. However, the fact that 
black jurors are less likely to make it through death qualification 
refutes that argument against eliminating prosecutors’ 
peremptory strikes. Opponents can find support in Baldus’s 
study, since Baldus indicates that defense attorneys also seem 
to use their peremptory strikes on jurors in racially biased 
ways.117 If fewer black jurors are making it through death 
qualification, however, it will be harder for defense attorneys to 
mitigate racially charged peremptory strikes by the prosecution, 
because the pool of black jurors will already be reduced in size 
compared to the pool of white jurors.118 Additionally, in the 
jurisdictions where black defendants are more frequently 
sentenced to the death penalty, such as Louisiana or Alabama, the 
 
 111 Contra J. Thomas Sullivan, The Demographic Dilemma in Death Qualification 
of Capital Jurors, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1107, 1110 (2014) (indicating that black citizens 
are more likely to be opposed to the death penalty than white citizens, and thus, not end 
up on capital trial juries). 
 112 See Baldus et al., supra note 42, at 40. 
 113 See id. at 47 (indicating that researchers only looked at the number of strikes 
used against those that were “strike-eligible,” meaning the only way they could be struck from 
the jury is with a peremptory strike). 
 114 See supra notes 101–104 and accompanying text. 
 115 For discussion on why this essay chooses to focus on purely capital trials, 
see infra Part III. 
 116 See Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 33–34 (1986) (indicating that questions of 
race become more serious in capital trials than in non-capital felony trials). 
 117 Baldus et al., supra note 42, at 72. 
 118 See Sullivan, supra note 111, at 1110, 1134 (presenting evidence that black jurors 
are more likely to be opposed to the death penalty, and thus, not meet death qualification). 
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typical jury venire itself has an underrepresentation of potential 
black jurors.119 Again, this would make it more difficult for defense 
attorneys to just cancel out racially charged strikes by prosecutors. 
The existence of death qualification presents additional 
reasons for adopting the proposal of eliminating prosecutors’ 
peremptory strikes in interracial capital cases. The presence of 
death qualifications means that prosecutors attain an advantage 
against defense attorneys, since prosecutors now have another 
means to strike for cause that in no way help the defense.120 This 
proposal would help balance the scales by substantially 
increasing the possibility that black jurors serve on juries. 
Accordingly, the presence of death qualification favors eliminating 
prosecutors’ peremptory strikes in interracial capital cases. 
D. Prosecutors’ Strategic Advantages of Striking Black 
Jurors in Interracial Capital Cases, Where the 
Defendant is Black and the Victim is White 
Prosecutors have a strategic advantage when fewer black 
jurors are present on the jury because a deficiency of black jurors 
diminishes juror empathy towards a black defendant.121 In 
interracial cases, empathy plays a bigger role than in other 
cases, because a white jury would more likely empathize with a 
white victim, and not with a black defendant, while the inverse 
is also true.122 Although “there has been a decline 
in . . . demonstration of . . . prejudice and endorsement of explicitly 
racist beliefs,” the strategic advantage for prosecutors still persists 
due to more subdued forms of bias.123 
One possible explanation for the continued evidence of 
racial prejudice in jury proceedings is that overt acts of racism are 
merely being subdued into forms of micro-aggressions that affect 
 
 119 See, e.g., Stephanie Domitrovich, Jury Source Lists and the Community’s 
Need to Achieve Racial Balance on the Jury, 33 DUQ. L. REV. 39, 50–52 (1994) (noting 
cases from southern states that discuss the lack of minority representation among jury 
venire members); Robert C. Walters, Michael D. Marin & Mark Curriden, Jury of Our 
Peers: An Unfulfilled Constitutional Promise, 58 SMU L. REV. 319, 320 (2005) (discussing 
the lack of cross-sectional equal representation among jury venire members in Texas); 
see also ELIZABETH DAVIS & TRACY L. SNELL, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 
251430, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 2016 at 2–4 (2018), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/
cp16sb.pdf [https://perma.cc/D9RD-34PW]. 
 120 See Kimberly Tibbetts, Note, Qualified to Convict: State v. Griffin and the 
Constitutionality of Death-Qualified Juries in Connecticut, 22 QLR 359, 363 (2003) 
(indicating that juries subject to death qualification are more conviction prone). 
 121 See Douglas O. Linder, Juror Empathy and Race, 63 TENN. L. REV. 887, 901 (1996). 
 122 See id. 
 123 Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, White Juror Bias: An 
Investigation of Prejudice Against Black Defendants in the American Courtroom, 7 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 201, 208 (2001). 
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juror decision making at trial.124 For example, “[t]oday, many 
[w]hites [may] express their anti-[b]lack sentiment . . . . through 
opposition to social policies designed to facilitate equality, such 
as affirmative action. . . . [or] through the endorsement of 
statements such as ‘[b]lacks are getting too demanding in their 
push for equal rights.’”125 So while it seems like our society has 
moved past overtly negative racial sentiments, in reality, these 
attitudes are hidden and play out in trials.126 This explanation, 
however, does not display the whole picture for several reasons. 
First, it assumes that the white members of juries will hold racially 
charged viewpoints, whereas some white jurors may sincerely hold 
no ill will towards black citizens. Second, this explanation does not 
account for the disparity present in interracial cases. If black 
defendants were always harmed by the attitudes of white jurors, 
then the race of the victim would not matter. 
Instead, the full explanation for racial imbalances is likely 
a combination of overt biases and implicit in-group behaviors.127 
One important form of implicit bias in the sentencing context is 
that a person is more likely to place themselves in the shoes of 
someone of their own race, and will experience more difficulty 
doing so for someone of another race.128 This bias can be referred 
to as “racial empathy.” Another would be implicating biases that 
cast the person in a negative racial stereotype.129 
Forms of implicit bias are not overt choices, but ones that 
happen without jurors even being aware that the phenomenon 
is happening.130 Further, this implicit bias is likely always 
present.131 This would prejudice a white defendant in an 
interracial capital case with an all-black jury, in the same way 
as a black defendant in an interracial capital case with an all-
white jury. Thus, by playing off of the existence of this implicit 
bias, having interracial juries in interracial cases ensures 
empathy for the defendant and the victim. 
While some may argue that racial empathy is bad in all 
instances, since it means race has an effect on the proceeding, 
 
 124 Id. at 208–09. 
 125 Id.  
 126 See id. at 208–09. 
 127 See Cynthia Lee, A New Approach to Voir Dire on Racial Bias, 5 UC IRVINE 
L. REV. 843, 860 (2015). An in-group is a group that someone psychologically identifies 
as being a member of, and therefore, in-group behavior is behavior derived from that 
feeling of belonging to that group vs. another group. 
 128 See Linder, supra note 121, at 888; Lee, supra note 127, at 860. 
 129 See Claudia Dreifus, Perceptions of Race at a Glance, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5. 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/06/science/a-macarthur-grant-winner-tries-to-unearth-
biases-to-aid-criminal-justice.html [https://perma.cc/69CD-YB4B]. 
 130 See Lee, supra note 127, at 860. 
 131 See id. 
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such empathy could be a good thing because it could lead to more 
careful deliberation of the evidence.132 Typically, this comes in 
the form of one group being “more receptive . . . to mitigating 
evidence,” and therefore, presenting arguments to other jurors 
about the importance of accepting the mitigating evidence.133 
Further, the Supreme Court has pointed out that careful 
deliberation is even more important in capital cases because of 
the highly subjective nature of mitigating evidence.134 Juries can 
use mitigating evidence to decide, even when a defendant is 
guilty of a capital offense, that the defendant should not be 
sentenced to the death penalty because of mitigating 
circumstances, which lessen either the seriousness of the crime, 
or the seriousness of the culpability of the crime.135 
The existence of racial biases continues to underscore the 
major problem: the modern application of the death penalty has 
a race problem since a combination of the race of the defendant 
and the race of the victim leads to a higher possibility of a death 
sentence. This problem is caused by the denial of black jurors 
from serving on death penalty cases through the use of 
peremptory strikes. Accordingly, eliminating this barrier will 
ameliorate this problem. 
III. ELIMINATING PROSECUTORS’ PEREMPTORY STRIKES FITS 
WITHIN EXISTING CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE 
Armed with this empirical knowledge, legislatures could 
change the way their respective states conduct peremptory strikes. 
The elimination of peremptory strikes, however, fits neatly within 
current constitutional jurisprudence, and based on precedent, 
courts would be acting within their power to eliminate the use of 
prosecutors’ peremptory strikes in interracial capital trials. 
Specifically, courts can utilize the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendment right to a fair trial to abolish peremptory strikes.136 
Those who would argue that the solution should be found 
in the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection 
 
 132 Christopher M. Bellas, “I Feel Your Pain”: How Juror Empathy Effects 
Death Penalty Verdicts 63 (2010) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Kent State 
University). https://etd.ohiolink.edu/pg_10?0::NO:10:P10_ACCESSION_NUM:kent1276
566375#abstract-files [https://perma.cc/XQD6-3SY7]. 
 133 Id. 
 134 See Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 33–35 (1986) (discussing the major role 
racial biases can play in jurors considering mitigating evidence). 
 135 Mitigation in Capital Cases, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN CONTEXT, 
https://capitalpunishmentincontext.org/issues/mitigation [https://perma.cc/7DAR-GKQG] 
(describing mitigation in the capital punishment context). 
 136 See U.S. CONST. amends. VI, XIV. 
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are mistaken. Those with this idea may argue that since 
peremptory strikes are utilized to strike minority jurors, it 
would therefore seem intuitive that a challenge be brought 
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Yet, the Supreme Court has already rejected the 
idea that the system of peremptory strikes must be eliminated 
as a matter of equal protection.137 Even with Justice Marshall 
asking the Court to eliminate strikes under equal protection, the 
Court refused to do so.138 Thus, Batson already forecloses the 
possibility of an equal protection challenge. 
On the other hand, the Batson ruling also makes it clear 
that peremptory strikes can be subject to constitutional 
attacks.139 Specifically, in Batson, the Supreme Court recognized 
that under the Equal Protection Clause, a defendant would have 
to show that intentional discrimination infected the defendant’s 
trial.140 An onerous requirement is not necessary, however. This 
essay’s proposal does not fit within equal protection 
jurisprudence, because this essay attempts to invalidate an 
entire method of procedure. Therefore, instead of bringing a 
challenge under the Equal Protection Clause, litigants should 
bring a challenge under the right to fair trial guarantees of the 
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
A. Eliminating Peremptory Strikes Under Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendment Jurisprudence 
Under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, the 
Supreme Court has held that certain procedures for picking a 
jury in interracial capital cases lead to such a high risk of race 
infecting the deliberations that for every interracial capital case, 
the jury selection procedure must be designed differently than 
in other trials, in order to ensure a fair trial.141 In other words, it 
must be different because “[t]he risk of racial prejudice infecting 
a capital sentencing proceeding is especially serious in light of 
the complete finality of the death sentence.”142 The case 
supporting this idea is Turner v. Murray.143 To fully understand 
that case, however, we must first understand the Supreme 
Court’s opinion in Ristaino v. Ross. 
 
 137 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986) (amending procedure for 
peremptory strikes, but not eliminating the practice). 
 138 See id. at 102–03 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
 139 See id. at 95–96 (majority opinion). 
 140 Id. at 95–96. 
 141 Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 33–37 (1986). 
 142 Id. at 35. 
 143 Id. at 28. 
182 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84:1 
In Ristaino, a black defendant was tried and convicted of, 
inter alia, “robbery . . . [and] assault, and battery by means of a 
dangerous weapon” against a white victim.144 Note that none of 
these offenses are capital crimes.145 The defendant in Ristaino 
attempted to ask a question at jury selection about racial 
prejudices held by the potential jury panelists.146 The record 
indicated that the only particularity warranting such in the case 
was that the defendant was black and that the victim was 
white.147 The trial judge found such reasoning uncompelling, and 
refused to allow that question to be presented to the jury.148 After 
he was convicted, the defendant attacked the fact that racial 
attitudes were not discussed during voir dire, arguing that the 
defendant’s right to fair trial entitled him to ask jurors about 
their views on race.149 While the Court acknowledged that under 
special circumstances, a judge may be required by the 
Constitution to ask jurors about their attitude towards race,150 the 
Court stated that a case where the only special circumstance is 
that the defendant is black and the victim is white is not enough 
to create constitutional concerns requiring special procedure.151 
Turning to Turner v. Murray, the prosecution sought the 
death penalty against a black defendant for killing a white 
victim in connection to a robbery.152 During the jury selection, 
the defendant requested that a question be submitted to the jury 
asking the panelists about their views on race.153 The trial judge, 
saying that the Supreme Court and the Constitution do not 
require such a question, refused to present the question on racial 
attitudes to the jury.154 In subsequent appeals and habeas 
petitions, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit agreed, holding that the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Ristaino v. Ross155 found that such a question was not necessary, 
even in interracial cases, and thus, the judge did not err by 
refusing to allow a question about racial attitudes to be presented 
 
 144 Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 589–90 (1976). 
 145 See id. (not discussing capital punishment, which indicates that these crimes 
were not capital). 
 146 Id. at 590. 
 147 Id. at 591. 
 148 Id. 
 149 Id. at 593. 
 150 Id.; see also Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 525–27 (1973) (holding 
that a case involving a civil rights activist, who is claiming he is being maliciously 
prosecuted because of his involvement in the black civil rights movement, presents 
special circumstances that require a judge to interrogate jurors about racial prejudice). 
 151 See Ristaino, 424 U.S. at 597–98. 
 152 See Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 29 (1986). 
 153 See id. at 30–31. 
 154 Id. at 31. 
 155 Ristaino, 424 U.S. at 589. 
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to potential jurors.156 Perhaps the lower courts cannot be blamed 
for this conclusion because under Ristaino, Turner seems like a 
straightforward case, since it has nearly identical facts.157 
Yet, the Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit in 
Turner, and recognized that “[w]hat sets this case [Turner] apart 
from Ristaino, however, is that in addition to petitioner’s being 
accused of a crime against a white victim, the crime charged was 
a capital offense.”158 This led the Court to come out in the other 
direction, and to require that the trial court apply a special 
procedure that was not afforded to the defendant in Ristaino.159 
In other words, every interracial capital case contains special 
factors that require special procedure in order to guarantee a 
fair trial. The Court elaborated further, saying that because 
Turner was a capital case, “the jury [was] called upon to make a 
‘highly subjective, unique, individualized judgment regarding the 
punishment that a particular person deserves.’”160 Such a 
subjective judgment presents a high chance of racial discrimination 
entering the picture, and so special procedures should be in place.161 
There are two specific ways this subjective judgment 
takes form. First, the jury has to take into account future 
dangerousness.162 This requires the jury to consider whether the 
defendant is a person with such a propensity for violence, such 
that the best way to deter future violence is for the defendant to 
die.163 The Court recognized that this is a highly personal 
analysis that easily invites racial attitudes to affect each juror’s 
decision.164 Second, jurors are asked to consider mitigating 
evidence.165 As discussed earlier, mitigating evidence varies 
substantially, but all mitigating evidence shares the 
characteristic of being open to the subjective judgment of the 
juror.166 The Court was concerned that, without a special 
procedure, explicit or implicit biases would affect the 
proceedings.167 The Supreme Court recognized that because 
capital trials are different from other trials, the mere fact that a 
capital case is interracial means that the Constitution requires 
 
 156 Turner, 476 U.S. at 31–33. 
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a different procedure than other cases—a procedure with eyes 
wide open to the race of the defendant and the victim.168 
There are striking similarities between the proposal 
espoused by this essay and what the Supreme Court required in 
Turner. First, this essay advocates for a special procedure in only 
interracial capital cases169—a class of cases that the Supreme 
Court in Turner recognized as presenting “special 
circumstances.” Specifically, the Court is concerned that the 
stakes are too high in a capital case to even risk racial prejudice 
influencing the verdict.170 Similarly, this essay is concerned that 
peremptory strikes create the very risk of racial prejudice the 
Supreme Court sought to ameliorate in Turner. As the studies 
above demonstrate, black defendants who are accused of killing 
white victims are far more likely to receive the death penalty.171 
One reason for this is because peremptory strikes in interracial 
cases have denied black jurors the ability to empathize with 
defendants, and thus, provide argument in jury deliberations 
that could cancel out implicit in-group thinking or explicit racial 
animus. This also explains the disproportionate rate of death 
sentences for black defendants.172 
B. The Need to Extend Turner 
While eliminating peremptory strikes may seem like it 
goes further than what the Supreme Court required in Turner, 
the empirical analysis above also shows that it is necessary to go 
this far. Turner demonstrates that, when stripped of the 
rhetoric, the main question to ask about procedure is whether 
that procedure is unfair because it risks racial prejudice, thereby 
stacking the deck against the defendant. As the above discussion 
demonstrates,173 that is precisely what prosecutors’ peremptory 
strikes have been doing in interracial capital cases. Therefore, 
since the risk of racial discrimination is clear, under the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments, courts should eliminate prosecutors’ 
peremptory strikes in interracial capital cases. 
 
 168 Id. at 36–37. 
 169 While this essay chooses to discuss the issues of racial prejudice in relation 
to black defendants who are accused of committing crimes against white victims, the 
analysis may apply across to instances at any time when prosecutors have the ability to 
use peremptory strikes to strike minority jurors. Future research should observe the 
effects on other racial minority groups, such as Latino Americans. 
 170 Turner, 476 U.S. at 37. 
 171 See supra Part II. 
 172 See supra Section II.A. (describing how black defendants are overrepresented 
on death row). 
 173 See supra Section II.B. (describing how prosecutors have used peremptory 
strikes to disproportionally strike jurors that are the same race as the defendant). 
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Opponents of this view may argue that such a rule does 
not square with our modern equal protection jurisprudence. 
These opponents will argue that our Constitution preaches color 
blindness.174 Yet, the procedure advocated by this essay instructs 
a court to look at the race of the defendant and the victim in 
order to determine whether the special procedure should be 
utilized. Opponents would say this is a problem because it may 
lead to unequal treatment of black and white defendants, and 
that this is inconsistent with color blindness jurisprudence. 
Proponents, however, would indicate that the procedure 
advocated here does not provide for special treatment of one race 
against another. Instead, the procedure advocated by this essay 
would also extend to a white defendant who killed a black victim, 
or any other variance of interracial capital case,175 or any other 
permutation of the theory. Further, proponents of this essay 
may point out that Turner already demonstrated that in this 
context, race is so important that a judge cannot merely ignore 
race entirely.176 Thus, the Supreme Court recognized, that far 
from contradicting the Constitution, taking race into account is 
actually mandated by the Constitution’s guarantee of a fair 
trial.177 Therefore, this position is consistent with constitutional 
notions of fairness, even though it has eyes wide open to race. 
C. “Death is Different”178 Under Turner and Other 
Constitutional Precedent 
Finally, Turner is part of a body of jurisprudence that 
commands peremptory strikes only be taken away from 
prosecutors, known as “death is different” jurisprudence.179 In 
criminal law, the American legal system already applies a 
higher standard of evidence than a civil trial and presumption 
of innocence in every case because the stakes are high for a 
 
 174 See Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 287–88 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring) 
(“Such a view [that racial discrimination is permitted] does not do justice to a Constitution 
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 175 And while the research discussed focuses on black defendants with white 
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 177 Id. at 36. 
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criminal defendant.180 In every criminal case, the defendant is at 
risk of losing his or her liberty, and the importance of this 
interest requires procedure in favor of the defendant.181 But 
“death is different” jurisprudence recognizes that the stakes are 
even higher, because it is not the defendant’s liberty, but his or 
her very life on the line.182 Thus, this body of jurisprudence argues 
that the death penalty “require[s] extraordinary procedural 
protection against error.”183 
One reason for the need for additional procedures is that 
the finality of the death penalty makes it irreversible if carried 
out erroneously.184 Additionally, the death penalty is the most 
severe punishment.185 Finally, 
In the words of Justice Stevens, the death sentence “is the one 
punishment that cannot be prescribed by a rule of law as judges 
normally understand rules,” but is instead an ethical judgment 
expressing the conscience of the community as to whether “an 
individual has lost his moral entitlement to live.”186 
Taken together, the finality, severity, and morality arguments 
indicate that a defendant needs additional procedural safeguards, 
such as the procedural safeguard proffered here. 
Finally, peremptory strikes should only be removed from 
the prosecution, because the Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial 
does not extend to the state.187 Nowhere is the right to a fair 
trial—one that the defendant holds alone—more important than 
in a capital case.188 Thus, the law dictates that this procedural 
safeguard inhibit prosecutors’ peremptory strikes only. 
CONCLUSION 
The United States’ current application of the death 
penalty has a race problem, whereby black defendants are far 
more likely to be sent to death row. One reason this problem 
exists is because of the denial of black jurors from serving on 
juries in which a black defendant has allegedly killed a white 
victim. The way in which these black jurors are denied from 
 
 180 See Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 486 n.13 (1978). 
 181 See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525–26 (1958). 
 182 See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976). 
 183 Jeffrey Abramson, Death-is-Different Jurisprudence and the Role of the 
Capital Jury, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 117, 117 (2004) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 184 Id. at 118. 
 185 Id. at 118–19. 
 186 Id. at 119 (quoting Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 468–69 (1984) (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part)). 
 187 See In re Kansas City Star Co., 143 F.R.D. 223, 228 (W.D. Mo. 1992). 
 188 See id. 
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serving on the jury is through prosecutors’ use of peremptory 
strikes. As a result, the justice system is denied jurors’ empathy 
towards defendants, while the trial may be infected with racial 
preferences for the victim—the result of which is less careful 
deliberations. Yet, careful deliberations are especially important 
in capital cases—so much so that the Supreme Court has already 
held that under the right to a fair trial, courts must apply special 
procedures in order to prevent the risk of racial prejudice 
affecting interracial capital cases.189 Therefore, considering the 
risk posed under the right to a fair trial, prosecutors’ peremptory 
strikes should be eliminated. 
Perhaps, if such procedure had existed at the time 
Clarence Lee Brandley was charged on thin evidence, Brandley 
would never have been convicted. The prosecution would have 
been unable to peremptorily strike the black jurors, and 
Brandley would have benefited from the empathy that black 
jurors could have demonstrated. And the color of Brandley’s skin 
would not have played a role in his death sentence. 
 
 189 Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36–37 (1986). 
